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July 24, 2018

Ms. Laurie Balfour
Executive Director
Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board
2440 Canadian Western Bank Place
10303 Jasper Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta T5J 3N6

Via email airb@gov.ab.ca

Re: Annual Review of Automobile Insurance Loss Experience

Dear Ms. Balfour:

Please find enclosed the required signed original of the Facility Association submission to the Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board's Annual Review of Automobile Insurance Loss Experience. Please note we will also be submitting an additional submission which addresses the draft Oliver Wyman ("OW") reports entitled "Annual Review of Industry Experience – Preliminary Report as of December 31, 2017 Private Passenger Vehicles" and "Annual Review of Industry Experience – Preliminary Report as of December 31, 2017 Commercial Vehicles", both dated June 22, 2018.

Delivering our presentation at the Open meeting of August 14th on behalf of Facility Association will be:

David Simpson, President & CEO
Shawn Doherty, Senior Vice President, Actuarial & CFO

Please also find enclosed a signed disclosure form.

With respect to our presentation needs, we will be using a laptop-driven PowerPoint presentation to highlight facts and themes from our submission. A projector (with USB or HDMI cable connectivity) and screen are all that we need. We will email the presentation to you no later than August 3rd.

If you require anything further in the interim, please let me know directly.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David J. Simpson'.

David J. Simpson, M.B.A., FCIP, C. Dir.
President & CEO

c.c.: George Hardy, Facility Association Board Chair

Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board

Annual Review of Automobile Insurance Trends and Premiums August 14, 2018



FACILITY
Association

Submission
July 24, 2018

David J. Simpson, M.B.A., FCIP, C. Dir.
President & CEO

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 This submission provides the Alberta Automobile Insurance Rate Board (AIRB) with an annual
3 update on the size, volume trends and financial performance of the two Alberta Risk Sharing Pools
4 and the residual market segment for private passenger vehicles administered by Facility
5 Association (FA) on behalf of automobile insurers in the province. It is patterned on previous
6 annual updates for ease of comparison.

7 [Appendix 1](#) provides both a background to the history and operation of the Alberta Risk Sharing
8 Pools, and a brief overview of Facility Association’s other operations in the province.

9 Facility Association’s Mission and Vision are:

10 **Mission**

11 Facility Association’s mission is to administer automobile insurance residual
12 market mechanisms, enhance market stability, and guarantee the availability of
13 automobile insurance to those eligible to obtain it. We strive to keep the market
14 share of the residual markets as small as possible, so consumers may benefit from
15 the competitive marketplace to the greatest extent possible.


16 **Vision**

17 Facility Association’s vision is to be recognized and relied upon as a highly
18 efficient and effective administrator of automobile insurance residual markets,
19 whose objective opinion on residual markets and related issues is respected and
20 sought by stakeholders.

21 It can be seen that our position continues to be that residual market volumes (both in the Risk
22 Sharing Pools and the residual market segment) should be as small as possible. This stems from
23 the belief that consumers are best served by companies competing directly for their business in an
24 environment where those companies do not have to base decisions on how they approach the
25 competitive marketplace on the potential impacts arising from their compulsory participation in
26 residual market mechanisms. That is, residual market mechanisms should be small enough that
27 their presence in a compulsory auto insurance jurisdiction should be “incidental” to a company’s
28 competitive participation in that jurisdiction.

29 The chart at the top of the next page provides historical and projected Alberta individually-rated
30 private passenger vehicles counts for the FA residual market mechanisms collectively by year to
31 provide a longer term perspective, although the focus of our discussion is in relation to the period
32 since 2015, being the most recent low volume year at 122,201 vehicles (market share 4.5%), down
33 from the high level that was reached in 2005 (count of 273,170 and market share of 14.0%).

34 **Alberta individually-rated vehicle counts through the FA residual market mechanisms**



35

36 The Facility Association Residual Market (FARM) is a small volume, tightly defined pooling
 37 mechanism for higher-risk cars and drivers. The annual premiums for approximately 90% of
 38 individually-rated private passenger exposures insured through the FARM are capped by the
 39 insurance premium regulation grid. The volume vehicles insured through this mechanism dropped
 40 after the 2004 reforms, and, as indicated in Table 1 at the top of the next page, counts have
 41 decreased to approximately 1,530 in 2017 (market share 0.1%), a level we are projecting to be
 42 maintained for 2018 and 2019.

Table 1
 Alberta Private Passenger Residual Market Segment ("FARM") – Market Share

Year	Written Premium Basis		Exposure Basis	
	W. Prem (\$000s)	Mkt Share	W. Count	Mkt Share
2013	14,766	0.5%	4,088	0.2%
2014	13,764	0.4%	3,445	0.1%
2015	11,410	0.4%	2,543	0.1%
2016	7,587	0.2%	1,644	0.1%
2017	7,179	0.2%	1,532	0.1%
2018	7,740		1,538	
2019	7,833		1,538	

2018 and 2019 projections per the 2019 Preliminary FARM Outlook posted June 15, 2018 to the FA website (www.facilityassociation.com)

43

44 Table 2 below provides written premium volumes for the two Alberta Risk Sharing Pools, the Grid
 45 Risk Sharing Pool (Grid RSP) and the Non-Grid Risk Sharing Pool (Non-Grid RSP). The size of
 46 the Risk Sharing Pools can be influenced by a number of factors. Insurers tend to keep on their
 47 own books risks they believe to be adequately priced (logically, insurers have no desire to share
 48 risks they believe to be profitable with other participants in the market), and transfer to the Risk
 49 Sharing Pools (subject to eligibility rules) risks they believe to be inadequately priced.

Table 2
 Alberta Risk Sharing Pools – Market Share (Written Premium Basis)

Year	Total		Grid RSP		Non-Grid RSP	
	W. Prem (\$000s)	Mkt Share	W. Prem (\$000s)	Mkt Share	W. Prem (\$000s)	Mkt Share
2013	217,734	7.7%	135,874	4.8%	81,860	2.9%
2014	238,352	7.8%	155,765	5.1%	82,587	2.7%
2015	224,297	7.0%	138,309	4.3%	85,988	2.7%
2016	248,140	7.5%	148,472	4.5%	99,668	3.0%
2017	258,972	7.5%	159,965	4.6%	99,007	2.9%
2018	273,811		152,033		121,778	
2019	300,728		159,083		141,645	

2018 and 2019 projections per the 2019 Preliminary RPS Outlook posted July 17, 2018 to the FA website (www.facilityassociation.com)

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51
52
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Counts provide a better measure of volumes, and Table 3 below shows that while the Grid RSP is projected to see count declines in 2018 and 2019, counts in the non-Grid RSP are projected to increase.

Table 3
 Alberta Risk Sharing Pools – Market Share (Written Exposures or "Count" Basis)

Year	Total		Grid RSP		Non-Grid RSP	
	W. Count	Mkt Share	W. Count	Mkt Share	W. Count	Mkt Share
2013	123,561	4.8%	63,979	2.5%	59,582	2.3%
2014	133,164	4.9%	70,934	2.6%	62,230	2.3%
2015	119,658	4.3%	61,813	2.2%	57,845	2.1%
2016	131,112	4.7%	63,360	2.3%	67,752	2.4%
2017	132,941	4.8%	66,524	2.4%	66,417	2.4%
2018	136,187		58,392		77,795	
2019	148,357		60,641		87,716	



2018 and 2019 projections per the 2019 Preliminary RPS Outlook posted July 17, 2018 to the FA website (www.facilityassociation.com)

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Further, as indicated in the “growers vs. decliners” charts below (where each bar measures the projected change in count for member groups), 17 of 18 member groups are projected to increase

57 their transfers to the Non-Grid RSP for 2018 (significant users for the RSPs are requested, on a
 58 quarterly basis, to provide projected RSP usage by month to the end of the next calendar year – 9
 59 of the 18 member groups provided projections, but these 9 account for over 90% of the projected
 60 count for 2018). During periods of relative stability, we generally expect and see equal numbers
 61 of growers and decliners, so the significantly bias toward growers suggests market instability.

62 **Non-Grid RSP Projected Changes in Count by Member Group**



	# grps	chg
decliners:	1	(921)
no changers:	-	-
growers:	17	12,299

	# grps	chg
decliners:	3	(193)
no changers:	8	-
growers:	7	10,114

63
 64 There is a limit to the total number of risks that can be transferred to the Non-Grid RSP, as each
 65 member-group is limited to a 4% transfer amount relative to their previous non-Grid private
 66 passenger vehicles insured in the prior calendar year – we estimate that the maximum that could be
 67 transferred in 2018 at approximately 106,000 vehicles, so that the 78,000 projected transfers
 68 represents about 74% of the maximum. That said, 3 member groups are projected to be at over
 69 95% of their limit for 2018, and another 3 between 80% and 95% of their 2018 limits.

70 At its June 2018 meeting, the Facility Association Board of Directors (FA Board) took note of the
 71 increased projected transfers to the Alberta Non-Grid RSP for the remainder of 2018. The FA
 72 Board devoted a significant amount of time at the June meeting to dialogue on whether or not to
 73 increase the transfer limit of the Non-Grid RSP. Under the Plan of Operation, the FA Board has
 74 the authority to both increase the transfer limit of the Non-Grid RSP in its entirety or to increase
 75 the transfer limit for an individual member company.

76 While acknowledging that current cost pressures and pricing limitations could manifest themselves
 77 as availability issues for consumers, the FA Board has decided not to increase the transfer limit for
 78 the Non-Grid RSP at this time. The FA Board is of the view that such a measure would only serve
 79 to “mask” the underlying cost issues. The FA Board is also of the view that it is in the best
 80 interests of Alberta automobile insurance consumers that those issues be dealt with in a
 81 meaningful way. The FA Board will review requests for increased transfer limits from individual

82 companies through the prescribed process. This position was communicated to the Superintendent
83 of Insurance, and the Superintendent responded, stating, in part:


84 *“As you know, one of Government's top priorities is ensuring the cost of living in Alberta*
85 *remains affordable. In the coming weeks, we will be issuing a Request for Proposals*
86 *seeking an independent contractor to work with Treasury Board and Finance to conduct a*
87 *detailed study on claims and costs. A holistic review of the insurance industry will help*
88 *ensure that Alberta's insurance system remains sustainable, affordable, accessible and*
89 *fair.”*

90 (We note that the aforementioned Request for Proposal was released via Notice 06-2018 dated
91 July 19, 2018.)

92 The increased volume in the Non-Grid RSP is a concern for FA with respect to the potential
93 impact on availability for consumers in the voluntary market. While FA does not ask member-
94 groups to provide a rationale for their projections, there are some aspects of current market
95 conditions that may be contributing factors. In particular, the interplay of current rate level
96 adequacy, claims cost trends, and the current rate change cap of 5%, and the continued uncertainty
97 / predictability challenges related to bodily injury, notwithstanding the government's regulatory
98 clarification to the minor injury definition introduced in May of this year, and the Request for
99 Proposal for a detailed study on claims and costs per Notice 06-2018.

100 First, using the (all coverages) estimates provided in the preliminary Oliver Wyman Private
101 Passenger Report and the associated preliminary proposed benchmark assumptions, we have
102 estimated the associated all coverages ultimate accident year loss ratios (indemnity plus claims
103 expenses), and compared those ultimates against a target loss ratio level consistent with the
104 expense, discount rate, and profit provision benchmark assumptions as proposed in the OW PPV
105 Report. Comparing the target to the historical loss ratios provides some context for the *historical*
106 rate adequacy relative to the *current* proposed benchmark assumptions. These results are
107 summarized below, indicating significant rate deficiency (again, against the *current* proposed
108 benchmark assumptions).

109 **OW PPV Preliminary Report – All Coverages Loss Ratios and implied rate deficiencies**



110

111 The above would suggest that an industry-wide significant rate deficiency exists (potentially in
 112 excess of 20%) – a deficiency that may have existed over the course of at least a full underwriting
 113 cycle (typically 7-10 years). In addition, weighting the Report’s selected loss cost trends with
 114 coverage claims amounts suggests an overall annual increase in loss costs of approximately 5%,
 115 implying that the current imposed rate change cap of 5% is sufficient only to keep up with claims
 116 trends, without allowing the industry to deal with the apparent rate deficiency. This may be
 117 leading to individual insurer decisions that may ultimately adversely affect availability in the
 118 voluntary market.

119 Discussions over the last several years has correctly focused on the rapid deterioration in bodily
 120 injury results since 2011, which has created significant difficulty in accurately predicting claims
 121 costs. Predictability may ultimately be improved as a result of the minor injury clarification
 122 regulation released in May of this year, but it will take some time before the clarification is tested,
 123 and its impact measured with any degree of confidence. Given the potential current level of rate
 124 deficiency, it may be understandable for insurers to take a conservative assessment in the
 125 immediate term.

126 FA has released Preliminary Outlooks for calendar year 2019 separately for the FARM and the
 127 RSPs, and both are available on our website (www.facilityassociation.com). It is very important to
 128 remember that the Outlooks are a forward looking exercise and that the final numbers may differ,
 129 perhaps by substantial amounts, from those presented in both the Outlooks and in earlier tables
 130 presented hear.

131 The market share of the Alberta private passenger residual markets on a combined basis (i.e.
 132 FARM and RSPs), remain among the largest in North America, behind only North Carolina, the
 133 Northwest Territories and Nunavut as shown in Table 4 at the top of the next page.

Table 4
Top Ten Private Passenger Residual Market Jurisdictions in North America

Jurisdiction	Market Share (vehicles)
North Carolina	30.3%
Northwest Territories	10.5%
Nunavut	5.6%
Alberta (RSP & FARM)	4.9%
Nova Scotia (RSP & FARM)	3.7%
Newfoundland & Labrador	3.3%
New Brunswick (RSP & FARM)	3.2%
Ontario (RSP & FARM)	2.6%
Rhode Island	2.1%
Prince Edward Island	1.4%

Sources: Canadian data is as at December 31, 2017

USA data is for 2015 as per Insurance Information Institute


(<http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/auto-insurance>)

134

135 It is worthwhile to note that when we talk about “insurers”, “industry” and “member companies”
 136 in the context of private passenger vehicle insurance in Alberta, we are talking about a relatively
 137 small number of companies. For 2017, the top five companies (at the group level) represent
 138 approximately 69% of the insured private passenger exposures in Alberta, while the top 10
 139 represent 93% as shown in the pie chart at the top of the next page. While the associated
 140 “Herfindahl-Hirschman” index measurement at 12% does not directly raise competitiveness
 141 concerns (an index value of 20% or higher is usually indicative of a lack of competition in a
 142 market), the presence of several relatively large insurers in the province means that the decisions
 143 of one of them on what they will or will not transfer to an RSP can make a significant difference
 144 both in the volumes and in the financial results of that RSP.

145

Alberta Private Passenger Concentration (Member Group Level) 2017



146

147 In general, there is a correlation between residual market size and the degree of price competition
 148 permitted in a given jurisdiction. In the United States, rate regulation is under the authority of
 149 individual states similar to the provincial authority that exists in Canada. In the last decade or
 150 more there has been an increased trend in the U.S. to allow the competitive forces of the
 151 marketplace to regulate prices. Interestingly, for 2015 (the most recent year for which data is
 152 available), 40 states of the 50 states (including D.C.) reporting data had less than 500 private
 153 passenger cars insured through residual market mechanisms, and 46 of 50 states (including D.C.)
 154 reporting data had less than 1% of private passenger cars insured through residual market
 155 mechanisms (Texas does not report data).

156 In the past, we have said that it is our view that the move away from the “one size fits all” nature
 157 of the previous industry-wide rate adjustment process to a “File and Approve” system which
 158 reviews rates on a company-by-company basis would have a beneficial effect on residual market
 159 volumes due to the potential for increased price competition. That remains our view, despite the
 160 fact that we are not currently projecting decreases in RSP volumes, and we continue to believe
 161 (based on the available evidence) that pricing flexibility combined with product cost stability will
 162 be correlated with lower residual market volumes over time.

163 We also continue to believe that moving even further beyond a “File and Approve” system to one
 164 of open competition under the price ceiling provided by the premium grid regulation at some point

165 in the future would provide an additional opportunity to reduce the number of cars insured through
 166 the residual market mechanisms.

167 **FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE**

168 Table 5 below summarizes the financial performance of the Risk Sharing Pools since inception.
 169 The data in Table 5 is taken directly from our audited financial statements, and we've included our
 170 current projections for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 (these projected results are NOT included in the
 171 total in the table).

Table 5
 Alberta Risk Sharing Pools – Excess / (Deficiency) of Revenue over Expenses

	Total	Grid RSP	Non-Grid RSP
2005 (13 months)	(121,940)	(93,902)	(28,038)
2006	(22,064)	8,498	(30,562)
2007	83,935	93,357	(9,422)
2008	(103,445)	(73,490)	(29,955)
2009	76,563	85,747	(9,184)
2010	82,779	83,893	(1,114)
2011	(4,236)	13,432	(17,668)
2012	(22,509)	(1,556)	(20,953)
2013	(52,335)	(14,452)	(37,883)
2014	(79,843)	(39,190)	(40,653)
2015	(19,760)	(591)	(19,169)
2016	(115,825)	(69,699)	(46,126)
2017	(110,439)	(62,015)	(48,424)
2018	(97,584)	(48,592)	(48,992)
2019	(103,610)	(38,605)	(65,005)
Total (excluding 2018, 2019)	(409,119)	(69,968)	(339,151)

Source: FA audited Financial Statements

Projections consistent with 2019 Preliminary Outlook assumptions

172
 173 Automobile insurance is a business based on estimates – the true results of a given accident year
 174 cannot be known until many years in the future. Deriving estimates (especially initial estimates)
 175 for the RSPs is especially challenging from an actuarial perspective as it involves taking into
 176 account the independent decision-making of member companies with respect to what types of
 177 risks they will transfer to a given pool. The estimated ultimate loss ratios for the RSPs by accident

178 year and how those estimates have evolved over the last five years are shown in Table 6 (top of
 179 next page). Please note these loss ratios are on an “all coverages basis”, and include indemnity,
 180 allowed claims expenses, and an additional loading for other claims expense costs to put the
 181 ratios to allow easier comparisons with other sources of Loss Ratios. The industry loss ratios
 182 shown in Table 6 are Facility Association’s internal estimates for indemnity, and include a loading
 183 for allocated and unallocated loss adjustment expenses (ALAE & ULAE). Note, however, we did
 184 not load for Heath Levy costs (as some other sources of LR do). From our perspective, the values
 185 in Table 6 are then for illustrative purposes only.

Table 6						
Alberta Risk Sharing Pools and Industry Private Passenger						
Undiscounted Estimated Ultimate Loss Ratios (including loading for ALAE & ULAE)						
Valuation Period	Accident Year					
Grid RSP	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
as at Oct 31, 2013	74.0%	71.2%				
as at Oct 31, 2014	79.6%	79.4%	76.7%			
as at Oct 31, 2015	77.5%	80.0%	85.3%	81.6%		
as at Oct 31, 2016	79.6%	83.9%	92.4%	96.7%	88.5%	
as at Oct 31, 2017	78.9%	83.2%	92.3%	101.1%	103.3%	96.0%
Non-Grid RSP	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
as at Oct 31, 2013	109.0%	104.7%				
as at Oct 31, 2014	111.0%	110.7%	112.6%			
as at Oct 31, 2015	108.2%	111.3%	117.4%	109.9%		
as at Oct 31, 2016	109.9%	110.0%	121.9%	110.1%	120.2%	
as at Oct 31, 2017	108.4%	108.8%	121.8%	113.2%	128.7%	121.1%
Industry	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
as at Dec. 31, 2013	71.7%	71.9%				
as at Dec. 31, 2014	75.5%	76.1%	77.1%			
as at Dec. 31, 2015	75.0%	76.1%	77.3%	76.6%		
as at Dec. 31, 2016	75.4%	77.5%	79.5%	80.8%	80.1%	
as at Dec. 31, 2017	75.7%	78.1%	80.8%	84.2%	87.5%	83.5%


186
 187 Of course, the impact of the financial results of the RSPs on any one company may differ from the
 188 impact of the RSPs on the industry in total, as the impact of any one individual company depends
 189 not only on their transfers to the RSPs, but also on their market share (which dictates their share of
 190 the result of the RSPs).

191 **FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE INDUSTRY**

192 Because we must prepare our financial statements according to Generally Accepted Accounting
 193 Principles, our statements can only show the results of our own operations. As member companies
 194 incorporate their share of Risk Sharing Pool premiums and results into their own statements, they
 195 have to reflect items such as health levies, premium taxes, investment income, income tax effects
 196 and their cost of capital on those premiums and results. In past years, we have modelled the
 197 “overall industry impact” results. We are currently re-visiting the methodologies and assumptions
 198 for those illustrations, and will make them available once that work is complete.

199 One could look at the overall financial results of the Risk Sharing Pools and conclude that the
 200 presence of the Grid RSP has, and will continue to be, relatively benign. For those that do, we
 201 would again provide the following notes of caution:

- 202 · On an accident year loss ratio basis, the Grid RSP loss experience has been worse than that
 203 of the industry since inception (see all-coverages loss ratio chart below, which includes
 204 loadings to include all claims expenses). In the event of deterioration in industry loss
 205 ratios, we would expect the Grid RSP loss experience to deteriorate as well.



- 206
- 207 · Competitive enterprises need to generate a competitive level of return. To the extent that
 208 companies may not be generating a competitive level of return on approximately 7.5% of
 209 revenue (the current market share of the Alberta RSPs), that return must be generated from
 210 those paying the remaining 92.5% of premium in the marketplace.
- 211 · Taken together, the Risk Sharing Pools represent a large volume of premium likely to
 212 behave in a more volatile way than of most individual companies. For example, per Table

213 6, the Grid RSP loss ratio jumped from 83.2% to 92.3% from accident year 2013 to 2014,
214 and the Non-Grid RSP loss ratio jumped from 108.8% to 121.8% in the same period.
215 Although this volatility impacts all companies in a similar way, smaller companies with
216 limited financial resources very probably find those impacts more difficult to absorb. As
217 well, the presence of such large RSPs with their inherent volatility may act as a barrier to
218 entry to insurers who would otherwise seek the opportunity to serve Alberta consumers.

219 **CONCLUSION**

220 We stated near the beginning of this submission our belief that consumers are best served by
221 companies competing directly for their business in an environment where those companies do not
222 have to frame their business decisions based on potential financial impacts from residual market
223 mechanisms such as the Risk Sharing Pools and the Residual Market Segment.

224 Simply stated, maximizing voluntary market insurance availability for consumers can be achieved
225 in an environment where both the costs associated with the insurance product are stable and where
226 there is a significant degree of pricing flexibility. In a similar vein, we continue to encourage, as
227 we have in previous years, that steps be taken to ensure the protection afforded by the premium
228 grid remains as tightly focused as possible on the group of consumers it is intended to protect and
229 that insurers be allowed to charge adequate rates for risks not targeted by the grid. As long as the
230 premium grid remains in force, we believe allowing open price competition below the maximum
231 premium set by the grid will pave the way for the smallest possible residual market volumes in the
232 current regulatory framework.

233 **APPENDIX I: RISK SHARING POOLS BACKGROUND, AUTHORIZATION & OPERATION**234 **BACKGROUND**

235 Facility Association is an administrative mechanism that administers involuntary residual market
236 automobile insurance on behalf of the voluntary/private sector automobile insurance industry
237 across Canada. Created by the industry and empowered by statute, Facility Association's mission
238 and vision are:

239 **Mission**

240 Facility Association's mission is to administer automobile insurance residual
241 market mechanisms, enhance market stability, and guarantee the availability of
242 automobile insurance to those eligible to obtain it. We strive to keep the market
243 share of the residual markets as small as possible, so consumers may benefit from
244 the competitive marketplace to the greatest extent possible.

245 **Vision**

246 Facility Association's vision is to be recognized and relied upon as a highly
247 efficient and effective administrator of automobile insurance residual markets,
248 whose objective opinion on residual markets and related issues is respected and
249 sought by stakeholders.

250 Facility Association has a full-time staff of thirty-nine people and fulfills its mandate via a
251 network of outsourcing and professional services arrangements.

252 In Alberta, Facility Association administers the Alberta Risk Sharing Pool (RSP) (in reality, two
253 Pools – one for Grid risks and the other for Non-Grid risks) for private passenger vehicles. It also
254 administers the traditional Residual Market for non-private passenger vehicles and a very small
255 “Residual Market Segment” (with very tightly defined risk criteria) for private passenger vehicles.

256 Because all licensed automobile insurers in Alberta must be members of Facility Association, and
257 because they must participate in the residual market mechanisms administered by Facility
258 Association according to specified sharing formulas, their individual financial results are subject to
259 greater volatility and uncertainty than would otherwise be the case. Participation in the Residual
260 Market also imposes additional costs on Facility Association member companies for such
261 expenses as premium taxes and health levies on their respective shares of residual market
262 premiums and the cost of the capital that members must maintain to support residual market
263 premiums.

264 **THE RESIDUAL MARKETS - AUTHORIZATION**

265 In Alberta, Facility Association administers the RSPs and Residual Market Segment as authorized
266 by its Plan of Operation (Plan), which is approved by member companies and the Superintendent
267 of Insurance. (The Plan may be viewed and downloaded at www.facilityassociation.com.) All
268 companies licensed to sell automobile insurance in Alberta are required to abide by the provisions
269 of the Plan.

270 For risks ceded to the Alberta RSPs, the Plan requires Facility Association to maintain and report
271 separate financial results for those risks that are subject to the premium grid and those that are not.
272 This creates the need for two RSPs, commonly referred to as the Grid RSP and the Non-Grid RSP.
273 Both are for private passenger automobiles only. All financial results of the Alberta RSPs and the
274 traditional Residual Market are assigned to member companies based on their participation in the
275 Alberta automobile insurance market. That is, they are not spread across the other jurisdictions
276 Facility Association serves.

277 **THE RISK SHARING POOLS - OPERATION**

278 Essentially, a RSP is a residual market that acts as an industry-wide reinsurance mechanism that is
279 largely invisible to consumers and intermediaries. A consumer buys insurance in the normal way,
280 and the application is forwarded to a company underwriter. The underwriter assesses the risk and
281 then decides whether to keep it on the company's own books or to transfer the risk to the RSP
282 (subject to the operational rules and eligibility guidelines of the RSP).

283 Companies receive an expense allowance from the RSPs to cover costs such as those incurred for
284 policy acquisition, policy issuance, policy administration and claims servicing. That expense
285 allowance is set annually by the Facility Association Board of Directors in consultation with the
286 Alberta Superintendent of Insurance. For both RSPs, companies are required to submit 100% of
287 all premiums for all coverages on a policy and are eligible for 100% reimbursement of eligible
288 claims and related expenses. Financial balances (e.g. top **and** bottom lines) of the Pools are shared
289 among companies based on the proportion of a company's private passenger automobile exposures
290 not ceded to a RSP divided by the number of industry private passenger automobile exposures not
291 ceded to a RSP. As Facility Association is simply an administrative mechanism, all companies
292 receive a monthly report reflecting the operations of the Pool which provides them with the
293 amounts they are then required to book into their own financial statements.

294 The two RSPs differ primarily in the number of risks companies can transfer to each. For the Grid
295 RSP, companies can transfer eligible risks (i.e. risks whose premiums are capped by the premium
296 regulation or "Grid") without limit. This lack of limit is based on the philosophy that companies
297 are required to accept risks for which they have no control over price and, therefore, little or no

298 control over the financial results of that business. In a general way, the size of the Grid RSP will
299 be a function of how companies view the adequacy of the grid premium for a given risk. If the
300 grid premium is above, or approximately the same as, the company's own risk-based premium, the
301 company might prefer to keep the risk on their own books. The upper limit to the size of the Grid
302 RSP is, of course, a direct function of how many risks in the province are impacted by the grid.

303 For the Non-Grid RSP, companies can transfer up to 4% of written exposures not transferred to the
304 Grid RSP. This Pool is designed to help companies cope with the "take-all-comers" environment
305 in the province.

306 In a competitive market, most insurers tend not to target the entire universe of private passenger
307 automobile risks. Insurers generally each have their areas of expertise and a healthy competitive
308 marketplace tends to allow a proper mix of generalist and specialist/niche private passenger
309 automobile writers. Moreover, because it is a practical impossibility to have a perfect price for
310 every risk, most insurers choose to have risk eligibility rules to complement and protect their
311 respective pricing structures. An underwriter faced with a requirement to accept a greater degree
312 of risk than that contemplated by the company's classification system and rates can transfer that
313 risk to the Non-Grid RSP. The Non-Grid RSP has a relatively low limit to ensure that it does not
314 become used as a marketing tool. That is, without such a limit, companies could deliberately
315 adopt a strategy of underpricing certain risks to attract new customers. Because these risks could
316 then be transferred to the Non-Grid RSP, and because of the way all insurers share in the results of
317 the Pool, this would amount to companies growing their businesses at the expense of their
318 competitors.

319 The key point here is that RSPs are designed as mechanisms to promote stability in the
320 marketplace by making it possible for companies to accept risks they believe are not adequately
321 priced. Therefore, the general expectation is that RSPs by their very nature will operate at a
322 financial loss. It is also important to note that because the RSPs also act as a cross-subsidization
323 mechanism across the industry, at any given point in time, companies will have their own, unique,
324 financial results vis-à-vis the Pools.

Information Disclosure Statement

The Automobile Insurance Rate Board (AIRB) is mandated to conduct an Annual Review of automobile insurance trends and premiums relating to basic coverage and additional coverage for private passenger vehicles. In order for AIRB to complete its review, it needs to collect or receive information under the authority of sections 9 and 11 of the *Automobile Insurance Premiums Regulation*.

The AIRB is committed to making its rate setting process as open and transparent to the public as possible. Therefore, this is to notify you that any information (including personal or business information) that is submitted to the AIRB for consideration in the 2018 Annual Review will be considered made in the context of a public meeting, whether made as a written submission or an oral presentation. This information, including the recording of discussions held at the public meeting will be published on the AIRB's web site as authorized by the Minister of Finance under section 816(7)(c) of the Insurance Act.

I acknowledge that I am submitting the attached information to the AIRB in the context of an open public meeting in the rate setting process and that, subject to section 11 of the Automobile Insurance Premiums Regulation, A.R. 117/2014, I am not required by law or by the AIRB to provide this information, that I do so on my own account at my own instance. For these reasons, I understand that the attached information will be made public and I am submitting the information to the AIRB on that basis.



Signature

July 24 2018

Date

David J. Simpson

Print Name

Facility Association

Organization

If you have any questions concerning the management or disclosure of information related to the AIRB, you may contact the Executive Director by phone at 780-415-1126 or by email at Laurie.Balfour@gov.ab.ca.